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UNTANGLING FRENCH VOTING BEHAVIOR: 
Pierce Replies to Rosenthal 
Roy Pierce 
Rosenthal (1981) gets off to a bad start. The first sentence says "Pierce 
(1981) claims to have tested the Rosenthal-Sen (1973, 1977) spatial model 
of French voting behavior by using individual survey responses" (p. 363). 
Readers will look in vain for any such claim in my article. What I did, "by 
a different method than that employed by Rosenthal and Sen" (Pierce, 
1981, p. 118), was to apply the same basic theory from which the 
Rosenthal-Sen spatial model was derived: the Davis, Hinich, and Orde- 
shook (1970) concept of the relationship between alienation and electoral 
participation. 
I presented evidence in support of three propositions: (1) Participation 
at the second ballot in France in forced-choice situations can be accounted 
for by partisan attitudes (as measured by thermometer scores) but not by 
perceptions of partisan locations on the Left-Right dimension; (2) the par- 
tisan choices of the voters in such situations can be better explained by 
partisan attitudes than by Left-Right perceptions; and (3) deliberate ab- 
stainers in such situations resemble ballot spoilers, while chronic absten- 
tion and random abstention are long-term phenomena. 
I. The first of these propositions is the most important, both substan- 
tively and in relation to the Rosenthal-Sen spatial model (1973). That 
model accounted for spoiled ballots (as opposed to participation) at the 
second round of voting in France in terms of distances between the avail- 
able parties and the voter both when measures of partisan attitudes and 
Left-Right locations were employed as indicators of the distances involved. 
In other words, the Rosenthal-Sen (1973) work implied that Left-Right 
perceptions were as powerful a determinant of electoral participation as 
partisanship was. 
Now, I do not doubt Rosenthal for a moment when he writes that "Sen 
and I were mainly interested in testing the spatial approach, not in argu- 
ing for the Left-Right dimension" (1981, p. 368). But while I too had a 
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methodological interest in spatial analysis, I also had a major substantive 
interest in the role of the Left-Right dimension as a determinant of elec- 
toral behavior. I was, therefore, not content simply to report that my find- 
ings differed from those of Rosenthal and Sen (1973). Instead, I also sought 
to show why the Rosenthal-Sen model "worked" with Left-Right percep- 
tions when, according to my independent analysis, it should not have done 
SO. 
I concluded that the answer lay in two restrictions imposed on Rosen- 
thai and Sen by their use of aggregate data. When I incorporated those 
two restrictions into my own analysis, it too worked with Left-Right per- 
ceptions as indicators of distance, suggesting strongly that those restric- 
tions jointly accounted for why the Rosenthal-Sen (1973) analysis also 
worked under the same restrictions. But those constraints badly distort any 
effort to get at the determinants of individual electoral behavior for two 
familiar reasons: the impossibility of partitioning aggregate data to in- 
elude only those people whose behavior is to be "explained" and the impos- 
sibility of employing exact individual-level measures. 
In his reply to my article, Rosenthal (1981) makes no effort to refute my 
arguments concerning the effects of the use of aggregate data. Instead, he 
makes the curious and ultimately self-defeating argument that I erred be- 
cause I did not take into account that in some cases the Rosenthal-Sen 
model "predicts the average distance to the closest candidate will be 
greater for voters than for spoilers" (1981, pp, 365-66). That is a strange 
point on which to insist. It should be obvious that it must remain an excep- 
tion limited to comparatively few voters or the whole underlying theoreti- 
cal notion that alienation can be expressed in terms of distance between 
voters and parties crashes to the ground. 
Moreover, in explaining "this key point" (p. 363), Rosenthal demon- 
strates the extremely limited sense in which the Rosenthal-Sen alienation 
model can "predict" anything. It cannot go into effect until the electoral 
results are in. That is because the probability of any voter spoiling his or 
her ballot depends on a term, which Rosenthal calls "spatial location" 
(1981, p. 365), that is the product of the distance between the voter and 
the nearest available candidate times a coefficient, which he denotes as 
gamma, that varies from election to election and from party to party. 
Gamma, it turns out, is an atheoreticat term that must be estimated for 
each party on the basis of the electoral returns for the year to which it 
applies. 
Lastly, inspection of the table of estimates of gamma that Rosenthal and 
Sen present for the various parties in 1967 and 1968 (1973, Table 10) indi- 
cates that there is reason to doubt just how "spatial" their spatial model 
really is. Rosenthal illustrates his argument that the average distance to the 
closest candidate may be greater for voters than for spoilers with the case 
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of the third district of the department of Lot-et-Garonne in 1967. How- 
ever, on Rosenthal and Sen's own figures, the result of that same situation 
in 1968 would have been just the reverse of what he claims it was in 1967. 
The crucial aspect of the Lot-et-Garonne example that Rosenthal employs 
is that in 1967 the gamma for the Communists is less than half that for the 
Right; in 1968 it is nearly double that of the Right. It is difficult to under- 
stand in what sense these differing probabilities of nonvoting rest on "spa- 
tial locations" for--in the Rosenthal-Sen analysis--the Left-Right location 
of any given party was the same in 1968 as it had been in 1967. Party 
locations did not change from one year to the next; the empirically estab- 
lished gammas changed, and for unknown reasons that the guiding theory 
does not even purport to address. 
2. With regard to explaining partisan choice, my conclusion was stated 
this way: " . . .  perceptions of left-right distances do not account for partic- 
ipation, but once the voter has decided to cast a valid ballot, they account 
for his partisan choice, although not quite as well as partisan preferences 
do" (Pierce, 1981, p. 132). The evidence for this was a multiple regression, 
which produced a partial correlation coefficient of r = .36 for net advan- 
tage in partisan sympathy compared with a partial correlation of r = .29 
for net advantage in Left-Right distance. Rosenthal objects to my conclu- 
sion on the grounds that regression would be an inappropriate statistical 
model if the dependent variable were dichotomous, and the difference 
between .36 and .29 is only .07. 
The dependent variable is dichotomous, and ordinary least-squares re- 
gression would be inappropriate if the dependent variable were badly 
skewed. Indeed, we did not rely on multiple regression to account for par- 
ticipation at the second ballot precisely because the participants so greatly 
outnumber the nonparticipants. But the mean on our dependent variable 
for partisan choice (which was scored 0,1) is .65, which is within the ac- 
ceptable range. 
It is true that the difference between .36 and .29 is not large, but I do 
not think that my conclusion on this score, quoted above, makes any exag- 
gerated claim. However, it should be noted that the appropriate compari- 
son is between the two correlation coefficients squared, and that on that 
basis the larger score is some 50 % larger than the smaller one. 
3. Rosenthal's objection to my effort to distinguish deliberate abstainers 
from random and chronic abstainers and to show that the deliberate ab- 
stainers resemble the people who spoil their ballots rests mainly on the 
small number of cases available (to which I naturally called attention) 
and, it appears, a suspicion that I had some ulterior motive in reporting 
only weighted Ns in my Table 2 while I reported unweighted Ns elsewhere. 
Here is Rosenthal at work with regard to the number of cases: "Plunging 
ahead, however, one finds that Pierce has uncovered a grand total of nine 
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deliberate abstainers in Table 3. This represents less than one-half of 1 
percent of his sample, whereas second-ballot abstentions were 23.2 per- 
cent of the voting population" (1981, p. 367). I find it hard to believe that 
Rosenthal could not figure out that my deliberate abstainers represented 
some 4 % of the subset of voters with which I was working (those unable to 
repeat their first-ballot partisan choice at the second ballot) and that the 
total number of my abstainers, to be compared with the 23.2% he cites, 
was some 11% of the subset with which I was working. 
Now 11% is still far removed from 23 %, but just as aggregate data have 
their weaknesses so do survey data, and one of the latter's weaknesses is 
overreporting of electoral participation. However, while the underreport- 
ing of abstentions naturally affects case numbers adversely, there is little or 
no reason to think that the politically relevant attributes of the nonre- 
sponding abstainers are different from those reported by the respondents 
who acknowledge that they have abstained. That, plus the satisfactory 
levels of significance that I reported (which Rosenthal ignores), go a long 
way toward upholding my quite simple and theoretically sound notions 
that there is more than one kind of abstainer and that deliberate abstainers 
resemble ballot spoilers. 
As for Table 2, I reported only the weighted Ns in order to save money. I 
originally ran the table with weighted data and did not rerun it un- 
weighted because there was no technical need to do so. Where actual case 
numbers are important, I of course reported them unweighted. A rerun of 
Table 2 shows that while the weighted Ns reported in the two columns of 
that table are 49.5 and 28.0, the unweighted Ns are 48 and 27 respectively. 
REFERENCES 
Davis, Otto A., Melvin J. Hinich, and Peter C. Ordeshook (1970). "An Expository 
Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process." American Po- 
litical Science Review 64:426-448. 
Pierce, Roy (1981). "Left-Right Perceptions, Partisan Preferences, Electoral Par- 
ticipation, and Partisan Choice in France." Political Behavior 3:117-136. 
Rosenthal, Howard (1981). "Untangling French Voting Behavior: Tales of Aggre- 
gation." Political Behavior 3:363-369. 
Rosenthal, Howard, and Subrata Sen (1973). "Electoral Participation in the 
French Fifth Republic." American Political Science Review 67:29-54. 
Rosenthal, Howard, and Subrata Sen (1977). "Spatial Voting Models for the 
French Fifth Republic." American Political Science Review 71:1447-1466. 
